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“When you are faced with spending priorities on cargo security, focus on systems that reach 
beyond our borders, not within them. Focusing your spending programs on systems within the 
boundaries of our ports would be the equivalent of putting radiation detectors outside of this 
building. When the nuke gets that close, it is too late.”  
—Randall Larsen, CEO, Homeland Security Associates[1]  
Introduction  
This essay proposes a solution to U.S. cargo and port inspection and security problems through 
the construction and use of offshore ports to screen, inspect, and transfer cargo for delivery 
inside the United States. Such a system would use offshore platform technologies, called 
pneumatically stabilized platforms, to provide large acreage ports that would be more cost 
effective to maintain and more efficient to screen inbound ships and inspect and transfer cargo 
than alternatives—such as overhauling the current ports systems at home and abroad. Offshore 
ports are proposed as a critical link into a port and cargo security defense-in-depth system 
involving a cargo security information system, offshore ports, and the current ports system. Also 
proposed are public/private administrative models to regulate and manage the offshore ports.   
The Cargo and Port Security Problem 
The United States has a major cargo inspection problem of size, location, and time. Regarding 
size: 95 percent of all cargo entering the country passes through one of the nation’s 351 ports; 95 
percent of that cargo goes unchecked;[2] and of the 8,000 foreign commercial vessels that make 
60,000 annual port calls, the vast majority gain unabated access to U.S. soil.[3] The size of the 
problem increases dramatically over time: port cargo volume is expected to double by 2025.[4] 
The United States cannot securely handle the sheer volume of port calls, something not lost on 
enemies who have been unable to strike the U.S. homeland for almost four years now.  
The location problem is twofold, and worse. First, the instant foreign vessels reach a port of call, 
they are potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) shell casings for harbor-detonated 
nuclear weapons. There is currently no effective process to confirm that a ship is not a weapon. 
Second, even if all incoming ships and cargo were inspected, it would not matter because a WMD 
has already accomplished its mission. Currently, high risk cargo is either inspected at the port or, 
incredibly, driven to an inspection location one to fifteen miles inland. A potential weapon of mass 
destruction is thus unobstructed in its delivery inside the country, and even when identified as 
dangerous cargo, loses none of its destructive potential.  
Time is the ultimate trade-off in the cargo and port security problem. Not acting quickly to fix the 
problem will result in devastating consequences. Maritime transportation experts warn that the 
current global ports system can and will be exploited by terrorists with ships or containers filled 
with explosive and/or nuclear devices—it is just a matter of when and where such attacks will 
occur.[5] The consequences of just one such attack are estimated to run as high as $1 trillion in 
economic costs and are immeasurable in human costs.[6] 
Asa Hutchinson, the Department of Homeland Security’s former undersecretary for border and 
transportation security, summarizes the other side of the timeliness dilemma: “The waterways are 
a concern; we’re not there in a perfect security environment...(but) do you shut down our 
economic system…I think we learned that you can’t do that.”[7] The economic consequences of 
shutting down the Port of Long Beach/Los Angeles (which receives over 40% of the nation’s total 
container imports) or the Mississippi Waterway and Houston Ship Channel (which receive one-
half of the nation’s tanker imports) for an extended period of time due to security fears or 
inefficient port inspection procedures could trigger a recession.[8] And, because the inspection 
process is fundamentally flawed, and the country is so vulnerable to seaborne attack, even just 
the threat of a bomb becomes a credible nightmare. Time is also a major consideration when 
trying to convince several hundred state- and locally- subsidized port authorities to comply with 
increasingly onerous federal security standards. 
The size, location, and time issues embedded in the cargo and port security problem far exceed 
current proposals and resources, and they will not be resolved by tinkering with the existing ports 
system. A new system must be designed that is proactive and not reactive; applies the age-old 
military principle of a “defense-in-depth”; allows for the speed and cost of commerce; and 
comprehensively addresses global shipping from the product, to the container, to the ship, to the 
port, to the destination, all the way through the final delivery of every product in the container. 
New Port Technology  
Dating back to 1955, with Shell Oil Company’s development of techniques and equipment to float 
small-scale offshore oil drilling operations in all-weather conditions, semi-submersible hull 
technologies have invaluably advanced oil, gas, scientific discovery, and mineral extraction 
industries, among others.[9] While these technologies have worked exceedingly well in 
supporting some of the world’s most sophisticated sea systems, they are constructed as a single 
module, with the largest platforms scaling to 90,000 square feet, or approximately two acres. To 
gain precious acreage for more extensive sea operations, the platforms can be built vertically, 
rising several decks above the ocean’s surfac e. Many potential sea capabilities, however, require 
vastly greater horizontal breadth. Attempts have been made for years to link small platforms 
together into larger ones, but the pressure induced by sea waves and deck loading has resulted 
in structural failures.  
Recent contributions from public and private sector oceanic scientists, architects, and engineers 
have evolved the offshore technologies to reduce the stresses on the platform, allowing modules 
to be joined as floating structures that enable order of magnitude increases in scale—and 
associated load bearing capability—to the hundreds of acres, attenuate waves, and withstand the 
severest ocean conditions posed by even hurricanes, typhoons, or tsunamis. These stress 
reducing systems, referred to as pneumatic stabilized platforms (PSPs), decouple the platform 
from the waves. PSPs allow for the construction of permanent ocean real estate (see Diagram 
1—a reinforced concrete structure of a similar design using the PSP design principle) that can 
support the scale of a midsize municipal floating airport, a port with the load bearing equivalent of 
the nation’s median cargo volume facility, Port Vancouver (Washington), or a military installation 
the size of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.[10]  
 
As with many of the world’s greatest advances, the evolution to the new platform technologies is 
fairly easy to understand with the benefit of hindsight. Its scientific underpinnings are grounded in 
freshman-level college physics.[11] Grand platform scale is achieved through displacement, 
wherein concrete cylinder modules, which remain open at the bottom and closed at the top, 
capture an air pocket used for buoyancy.[12] Platform stability is maintained through a manifold 
and duct system that connects the individual cylinders, allows air to transfer between cylinders, 
and enables the platform to self-adjust as waves pass under it.[13] When a wave approaches the 
platform, the water column in cylinders closest to the wave rise. On normal floating structures, the 
rising wave creates lift (or heave) to the structure.  
The rise in one area and drop (or trough) in another creates the destructive stress. In the PSP, 
when the rising water column begins to compress the air pocket, the manifold and duct system 
allows the air to migrate to a cylinder or module where the column is falling. This reduction of 
wave energy, or decoupling the platform from the waves, gives the platform stability and reduces 
the stress that would otherwise be induced. The reduction of waves as they pass beneath the 
platform (i.e., wave attenuation) also creates a “calm sea” environment so that ships may be 
docked.[14] Figure 1 illustrates the closed top, open bottom, and manifold features of a PCP 




 Figure 1: PCP Singular Component (artist’s rendition, courtesy of Float, Inc.)  
 
 
 Figure 2: PCP Modular System (artist’s rendition, courtesy of Float, Inc.)  
 
As far back as the mid-1930’s, civil engineers developed the first concrete cylinder-based, air-
buoyant platform for construction of the mid-span suspension bridge caisson between Oakland 
and San Francisco (that is still in use today after the 1989 Oakland earthquake and millions of 
vehicles traversing the bridge).[15] Since then, there have been several more applications, to 
include a specially designed oil production platform for Global Marine in the Alaskan Sea[16] and 
a Defense Advanced Research Project Agency/Office of Naval Research-sponsored PSP model 
to test advanced wave attenuation and load distribution capabilities. New initiatives to apply the 
technology and their associated strategic implications include:  
· floating military targets to alleviate diplomatic pressures such as those incurred in 
Vieques, Puerto Rico in 1993;[17]  
· floating, movable military installations (a small-scale example of which is sketched in 
Diagram 2) to alleviate pressures of basing and overflight access as experienced in the 
Iraq War;  
· floating regional Asian energy centers to serve some of the world’s most densely 
populated cities;  
· a multi-purpose entertainment, casino, and restaurant complex adjacent to real estate-
challenged Monaco;  
· a wave energy facility off of the coast of England;  
· and several options for floating airport runways and even entire airports, as is the case at 
the San Diego International Airport.  
 
A Floating Ports System  
While government and commercial applications demonstrate the diversity of ocean real estate 
these new offshore technologies enable, the most significant application could be realized in a 
system of offshore ports to protect and defend the United States. Envisioning an ocean 
equivalent of the nation’s highway toll system, a series of cargo security screening ports could be 
strategically located as close as 2-3 miles or as far as 12-15 miles offshore,[18] transecting the 
major U.S.-bound global sea lanes.  
These offshore ports would build on the government’s Container Security Initiative (CSI)—an 
initiative that places customs officials at foreign ports to prescreen and target high risk cargo—by 
providing the opportunity to scan and inspect a high percentage of all suspect cargo while it is at 
sea. The offshore ports would also prevent a ship-based dirty bomb attack from affecting the U.S. 
population by offloading, scanning, and reloading cargo on secured lighters or barges; provide 
the option to prevent any foreign vessel from reaching U.S. shores (while still enabling foreign 
vessel cargo offloads at the offshore port); and provide a more efficient intermodal system in 
which platform-supported air, sea, rail, and truck cargo transfers could occur at a single location.  
An offshore port can be configured in a variety of ways, two examples of which are detailed in 
Diagram 3. A conceptual depiction of a smaller transfer port is provided in Diagram 4. Both 
examples in Diagram 3 are configured for ships to dock on the reverse side of incoming waves in 




Costs and Efficiencies 
Recent offshore platform construction estimates have been competitive with waterfront land 
values. Each platform’s costs are ultimately determined by its intended sea state environment, 
the proximity of the port to the construction site, and the variable costs of materials and labor. 
Higher cost platforms include a full array of intermodal operations, such as a tunnel and airfield 
for truck, rail, and air operations. 
For the purposes of this Strategic Insight , costs will be estimated for a hypothetical high end 
platform—on par with a 95-acre, 100-year typhoon-resistant, Asian transfer port that includes 
platform, anchoring, and top side systems, complete with its own power and water generation 
systems, plumbing, electrical, HVAC, fire suppression, insurance, front end engineering and 
development, and operational buildings. The rough order of magnitude in this example is $337 
per square foot, or $14.7 million per acre. 
Applying the hypothetical example’s assumptions, the costs and capabilities to construct, 
maintain, and secure an offshore versus traditional ports can be roughly considered. For example, 
the Port of Vancouver, Washington, with 4,650,000 tons of total cargo volume, is ranked by the 
American Association of Port Authorities as 51st out of the 100 major U.S. ports.[19] The Port of 
Vancouver is a 600-acre facility with 15 dockside acres that support 13 deep-draft vessel 
berths.[20] An offshore port with similar dockside capabilities would cost approximately $2.2 
billion if a full complement of intermodal operations were provided at the port (which they are not 
at the Port of Vancouver): 
 
Longer term cost-savings would be realized by strategically locating the offshore ports along the 
major sea lanes into the U.S., those entering the New England, Mid-Atlantic/Southeastern, 
Southern California, and Pacific Northwest regions (see Diagram 5 for one possible layout for an 
offshore ports system). Grouping the offshore ports as regional megaports would follow 
consolidation trends already sweeping smaller ports into larger hubs and smaller vessels into 
mega-container ships. A megaports system would reduce shipping transactions costs significantly, 
require fewer port calls, reduce nautical mileage at sea, and cut waiting and berthing times in port. 
Similar costs savings have been realized in the Port of Singapore, the world’s Asian 
transshipment crossroads that transfers regionally-bound cargo to smaller vessels for eventual 
offload among a large network of local ports. A similar concept has also been proposed as a 
transshipment port between Halifax and Scapa Flow to feed all Western European and North 
American ports.[21] 
The cost of not adopting offshore ports should also be considered. First, there are the federal 
government’s post-9/11 security standards. When compared to an overhaul of all 351 U.S. ports 
to be fully compliant across the expanding list of federal security standards—a cost estimate for 
which has been estimated to be so large that it has not been quantified beyond a crude estimate 
of “many billions of dollars”—a system of offshore ports is a bargain.[22] Second, there is the 
issue of the existing ports system’s need to serve a changing maritime industry. Megaships that 
now dominate the industry will be served only by expensively retooling hundreds of existing ports 
to accommodate this new breed of ships’ deeper water berthing requirements. For example, 
dredging operations to lower the New York Harbor by just 50 feet will require an outlay of $2.1 
billion.[23] If offshore ports are adopted, the land-based ports could receive cargo on shallow 
draft lighters or barges, so the expensive dredging upgrades would be significantly reduced or 
eliminated altogether. Dredging is also environmentally destructive, so cleanup and other costs 
could be realized through offshore ports’ construction as well.  
Cost comparisons become even more favorable when foreign port compliance is considered. 
Many nations have simply refused request to comply with U.S.-backed security standards due to 
the impossible economic damage that would be inflicted on their smaller economies to do so.[24] 
If foreign ports will not raise their standards, then the standards could be enforced at the offshore 
ports. Offshore ports also provide the opportunity to concentrate the government’s Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) people and resources in centralized locations, versus diluting their 
effectiveness by dispersing them throughout the world’s many ports.  
 
A Defense-in-Depth Strategy  
Providing the conceptual underpinnings for a comprehensive cargo and port defense-in-depth 
strategy, the Department of Homeland Security’s “A National Cargo Security Strategy White 
Paper,” envisions enhanced physical security of the global supply chain, recognition of nuclear, 
chemical, biological, and radiological materials as the highest cargo security threat, and the 
necessity to identify and inspect 100 percent of high risk cargo.[25] In realizing such a strategy, 
two essential elements must be considered: information systems and geography. The more 
information that is available about every ship and container that moves around the globe, the less 
likely that a dangerous shipment will leave one port or reach another. The further away from U.S. 
soil, or “pushing out our borders,” that such information enables, makes it much less likely that 
any cargo that might slip through a secure information system will still be able do its intended 
damage.  
Information systems would provide the first line of the defense-in-depth. The information systems 
security process would start before shipping commences, with an internationally sanctioned 
purchase order entry into a secure information system prior to cargo ever making its way into a 
shipping container.[26] Currently, port terminal operators have no reliable way of verifying that a 
cargo manifest matches the actual contents of a container.[27] Using Federal Express-styled 
tracking technology, a bar coded container could then be tracked from its inspected source 
through its destination.  
Recognizing that no information system is perfectly secure, an intelligence component of the 
cargo tracking system would target high risk cargo based on human and artificial intelligence—an 
algorithm of all of the system’s measurable criteria, such as cargo contents, point of origin, 
number and locations of cargo transfers, wholesalers and distributors, and every other cargo risk 
factor. Insurance, banking, and financial market algorithm systems have perfected artificial 
intelligence techniques to the point that the technology gets “smarter” in its predictive abilities with 
each additional use of the system.[28] The cargo security system would in effect become more 
secure with every container passed through the system. Coupled with a random inspection 
selection process that would be triggered in the information system, and the expertise of human 
intelligence analysts, high risk and randomly selected cargo could then be identified for a 
thorough search. All other cargo would go through a standard search process at later lines of the 
defense-in-depth described below.  
The cargo inspection site at an offshore port would be the second line of the defense-in-depth. 
Offshore ports personnel and systems would screen all high risk cargo and up to 75% of all 
remaining cargo. They would also be responsible for separating containers to transfer them to 
truck, air, ship, or rail from foreign vessels onto U.S.-provided transportation that would take the 
cargo to its ultimate destination. Currently, most every port in the United States lacks the onsite 
capability to disseminate and transfer cargo to sea, air, rail, and truck operations. Using the Port 
of Vancouver example, air operations commence only after a package is trucked 15 miles away 
to the airport. In the process of making the U.S. more secure, an offshore port would also enable 
an economically efficient hub and spoke transfer system into the country.  
If the second line’s offshore port was physically attacked, the consequences would be 
dramatically less severe than one at a U.S.-based port. A USS Cole-equivalent attack would not 
sink a several hundred acre platform due to the interlocking support provided by thousands of 
individually buoyant and concrete reinforced cylinders. Unlike steel, concrete does not conduct 
heat, so a conventional weapon’s damage would be locally contained. Even if a weapon caused 
damage enough to ruin an entire section of a large platform, that section could be released, 
dropped to the ocean floor, and replaced with a newly constructed section. The platform would be 
repaired in its present location without having to be transported to a port. A more consequential 
WMD attack might destroy or make uninhabitable the port site, which would still result in the 
confined destruction of the port facility itself, its docked ships, and its people, cargo, and supplies.  
In line with Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, Admiral James Loy’s belief that, “We want 
our existing ports to be our final line of defense, not the first,”[29] the third line of defense in the 
defense-in-depth would be the existing U.S. ports system. This line of defense would perform 
inspection on any cargo left uninspected.  
 Regulation and Management: A Public/Private Organizational Partnership  
A federal oversight and private delivery model would well serve an offshore ports system. Such a 
public/private partnership would provide for the necessary federal law enforcement, accountability, 
security, and control of foreign cargo entering the U.S., while also allowing for the private sector 
to compete and contract for intermodal transfer, offload, and shipping operations. Both 
government and industry would be able to consolidate currently redundant inspection, 
onload/offload, transport, and other operations.  
Establishing the offshore ports as federal installations offers several advantages. First, it would 
guarantee their subsidization and regulation to a common standard. The current ports system is 
fraught with taxpayer inequities in which local residents assume a disproportionate tax burden for 
cargo destined to go well beyond their jurisdiction’s borders. The system is also plagued by tight 
local and state budgets that cannot support many of the newly imposed federal security 
standards.  
Second, the federal government is the only entity that could both legally mandate and enforce the 
stopping of all ships bound for the U.S. and absorb the initial construction costs of an offshore 
ports system. A comprehensive system that includes ports intersecting sea lanes off of both 
coasts would total as much as $15 billion, and no single state, agency, company, or industry short 
of the federal government could absorb such an expenditure.  
Third, no entity other than the federal government would be capable of seamlessly conjoining port 
operations among the existing 351-ports system and integrate critical federal functions such as 
foreign intelligence, inspection, customs, international law, and law enforcement. An essential 
federal coordination role—intelligence sharing in the cargo security information system—could be 
facilitated through the new National Director of Intelligence, an office envisioned for just this type 
of task by President Bush who wants to ensure “that our intelligence agencies work as a single, 
unified enterprise.”[ 30]  
Private industry’s role would be to work within the federal offshore ports system to onload and 
offload cargo, transfer cargo to sea, air, and rail lines, and transport that cargo to the inland ports 
and other intermodal lines, and ultimately to its destination.  
While there are many different ways to organize around the public/private partnership principle, 
one possible scenario is charted below. 
 
Conclusion 
The current cargo and port security system is incapable of preventing or managing the 
consequences of a WMD attack; the time to fix the system is now. Offshore ports can contribute 
to a new cargo and port security system that has the depth and flexibility necessary to thwart how 
terrorists plan to attack us, respond to them when they implement their plans, and mitigate and 
recover from any event in which they are successful in implementing their plans. In addition to 
contributing to a more secure system, offshore ports can also provide a more economical one.  
For Further Information  
The following references provide further information regarding offshore platform technologies and 
their applications: 
1. R.C. Ertekin and H.R. Riggs, Evaluation of Pneumatically-Stabilized Platforms, Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)/Office of Naval Research (ONR), School 
of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology, University of Hawaii at Manoa, December 
31, 1998.  
2. Dr. Alfred Yee, President of Applied Technology Corporation, is a leading authority on 
offshore platform technology. His extensive list of offshore systems research and 
publications can be viewed at: http://www.precastdesign.com/media/aayresume.pdf.  
3. Donald Innis et al., Beyond the Horizon (White Paper), May 24, 2002.  
4. Cliff McMillan et al., Implementing the Beyond the Horizon Strategy: A Systems Approach 
to Seaport Security, September 17, 2002.  
5. Van den Noort Innovations BV: www.noort-innovations.nl/RFAplatform.htm.  
6. Float, Incorporated: www.floatinc.com.  
7. Offshore Ports, LLP: www.offshoreports.com.  
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